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If one blows away all the toxic miasma of American partisan politics, it 
becomes apparent that Donald Trump is not so much a “problem” as a symptom.    
Of course, the term “problem” in the context of this collection itself implies an 
unabashed partisan position, comparable to the present tendency for conservative 
talk radio hosts to decry the “problem” of the millennial generation enthusiastically 
embracing socialism, or the constant harping by young people, who have turned 
away from their evangelical upbringing, about their elders’ unflagging support both 
for Trump himself and their condemnation of gay marriage – unless what we 
consider truly “problematic” is that half of a certain population sees the issue entirely 
different from the other.  “Problematizing” Trump should run more along the lines of a 
physician problematizing a fever, which does not mean the kind old doctor takes the 
patient to task for falling ill, but rather seeks to diagnose, or trace the etiology of, the 
disorder itself.    
The election of Trump, as I have written elsewhere was a socio-cultural tremor 
of monumental proportions, unanticipated at the time by both pundits and analysts, 
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resulting from the mounting contradictions and dysfunctions within the neoliberal 
global economic system.1 The election itself, along with the ever intensifying, 
pestilential, and irreconcilable partisan warfare that has become normal and routine 
since that fateful event, bespeaks an acute, deep-reaching, and doggedly 
unacknowledged labyrinth of fissures and fault-lines that propagate beneath the 
political landscape.  American politics itself has become a gargantuan shared 
version of what psychoanalysis classically has termed an “obsessional neurosis,” one 
in which the account of the neurotic remains stringently unselfcritical, while the 
healer struggles to persuade the patient to take a more realistic view of the 
symptoms at hand in all their intricacies, vagaries, and nuances.   
 
The Meaning of “Obsessional Neurosis” 
Before trying to assess the symptoms themselves, however, it is important to 
understand what Freud and Lacan – the two twentieth century luminaries of 
psychoanalysis – understood by the notion of an “obsessional neurosis”.  Freud had 
built his earlier career on the clinical investigation of hysterics, about which he wrote 
a number of important papers in the 1890s.  I would note in passing that I am not in 
any way attempting to do what is sometimes dubbed “psycho-history”, or to 
psychoanalyze the principal combatants currently in the public square.  I am merely 
drawing on familiar psycho-social constructs as heuristic devices in elucidating what 
have obviously become collective psycho-social pathologies that are driven home to 
us in the round-the-clock news cycle. Freud seems to have first linked obsession 
with hysteria in an 1894 brief in which he criticized his contemporary Pierre Janet for 
overemphasizing the phenomenon of dissociation and “split consciousness.”  Rather 
than succumbing to dissociation, Freud writes, the patient   
…in order to fend off an incompatible idea…sets about separating it from its 
affect, then that affect is obliged to remain in the psychical sphere. The idea, 
now weakened, is still left in consciousness, separated from all association. 
But its affect, which has become free, attaches itself to other ideas which are 
not in themselves incompatible; and, thanks to this false connection, those 
ideas turn into obsessional ideas. This, in a few words, is the psychological 
theory of obsessions...2  
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In his subsequent observations throughout the 1890s Freud honed the notion 
of hysteria as a mechanism of “defense” against incompatible representations in the 
conscious mind, which are transformed into obsessional ideas, motivating the 
person to behave in bizarre, compulsive, and highly ritualized ways.  In 1907 in an 
article entitled “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices”, Freud tied these forms of 
behavior to sacred ceremonies, an insight which became the kernel for thesis in The 
Future of an Illusion that religion was a “universal obsessional neurosis.”  The 
obsessive, according to Freud, is unconscious of the ideational nexus toward which 
he or she is engineering a defense.  “The person who is obeying a compulsion 
carries it out without understanding its meaning – or at any rate its chief meaning.”  
Yet, even more significantly, the excessive affective response is determined by 
negative self-identification and feelings of self-reproach.  “We may say,” Freud 
argues, “that the sufferer from compulsions and prohibitions behaves as if he were 
dominated by a sense of guilt, of which, however, he knows nothing, so that we must 
call it an unconscious sense of guilt, in spite of the apparent contradiction in terms.”3       
 By the time Freud had moved on from clinical inquiries to what is often termed 
his “metapsychological” writings – the generalization of psychoanalytical discoveries 
in order to address broader philosophical questions about human nature, history, 
and society – in the aftermath of the First World War, he began to reframe the 
question of how obsessional ideas arose more in terms of what in that era came to 
be known as the “sociology of knowledge.”  In that respect, his thinking became 
more aligned with the Marxist theory of ideology, even though Freud himself was not 
at all a revolutionary.  Freud’s ideas eventually found resonances with the efforts of 
Gramsci and the Frankfurt school to redefine the phenomenon of class struggle as a 
cultural dialectic more than one of political economy. Writing in The Future of an 
Illusion in 1927 Freud noted that: 
…in all present day cultures…it is understandable that the suppressed people 
should develop an intense hostility towards a culture whose existence they 
make possible by their work, but in whose wealth they have too small a share. 
In such conditions an internalization of the cultural prohibitions among the 
suppressed people is not to be expected.4   
Thus, in the face of class resentment and revolt, it becomes necessary for the 
ruling elites to deploy familiar, accessible symbolic or cultural forms to forge new 
identities that render the proles more compliant and willing to do the bidding of their 
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masters.  Freud, in essence, was anticipating the later argument elaborated by 
Herbert Marcuse.   
The narcissistic satisfaction provided by the cultural ideal is also among the 
forces which are successful in combating the hostility to culture within the 
cultural unit. This satisfaction can be shared in not only by the favoured 
classes, which enjoy the benefits of the culture, but also by the suppressed 
ones, since the right to despise the people outside it compensates them for 
the wrongs they suffer within their own unit. No doubt one is a wretched 
plebeian, harassed by debts and military service; but, to make up for it, one is a 
Roman citizen, one has one‘s share in the task of ruling other nations and 
dictating their laws.5 
Marcuse, seeking to synthesize Marx and Freud in his Eros and Civilization (1955), 
identified sexual emancipation as the cipher in late industrial society for genuine 
revolutionary transformation.  However, in his later book One-Dimensional Man 
(1964), a groundbreaking work which directly as well as indirectly influenced the 
student revolts of that decade, Marcuse denounced the co-optation of the fledgling 
sexual revolution by consumer capitalism and corporate advertising, dubbing it 
“repressive sublimation”.  Instead of promoting the liberation of society, Marcuse 
argued, the sexual revolution as a ubiquitous feature of popular media had become 
a tool of capitalist exploitation. Popular culture en masse no longer consisted in “the 
denial and rejection of the ‘cultural values,’” but “repressively” sustained social 
domination “through their wholesale incorporation into the established order, 
through their reproduction and display on a massive scale.”  Marcuse added that 
these values, “in fact…serve as instruments of social cohesion.”6  
Marcuse in certain key respects refined Freud’s intuitions concerning not just culture, 
but also religion.  “Religious ideas,” Freud had written, as the gravamen of a 
“universal obsessional neurosis”, can be characterized as “teachings and assertions 
about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality which tell one something 
one has not discovered for oneself and which lay claim to one‘s belief.”7  The 
inaccessibility and inviolability of the sources of religious belief have to do with the 
fact that they amount to affect-configurations that are engendered by the disjunction 
between the true object of desire and its accompanying symbolic representations.  
As Freud notes, religious ideas are not at all cognitive errors or epistemological 
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defects.  On the contrary, they are simply “illusions.”  It is “characteristic of illusions,” 
he writes, “that they are derived from human wishes.” Freud as a child of the 
European Enlightenment, combined with his Austrian aristocratic contempt for the 
hoi polloi and his very real anxiety about the burgeoning of anti-Semitic as well as 
ethno-nationalist and fascist sentiments among the post-World War I democratic 
masses, was convinced that such “illusions” had no future if the intelligentsia stayed 
in charge.  “Civilization has little to fear from educated people and brain-workers. In 
them the replacement of religious motives for civilized behaviour by other, secular 
motives would proceed unobtrusively; moreover, such people are to a large extent 
themselves vehicles of civilization.”8  From the educated classes one could expect 
the accomplishment of “the same aims as those whose realization you expect from 
your God.”9  
Marcuse, however, writing in post-World War II America, recognized that 
psychoanalysis in the hands of the “educated classes” had ironically been snatched 
away by Neo-Freudian “revisionism” or “ego psychology.”  In Eros and Civilization, 
published in 1955 at the height of the Eisenhower era with its pressures toward 
social conformity and bourgeois paranoia over the menace of Communism, 
Marcuse had warned about the insidious translation of Freud’s critical insights into 
what Philip Rieff would later term the “triumph of the therapeutic”.10 Such Freudian 
“revisionism”, Marcuse claimed, was responsible for the kind of class oppression 
Marx had described, one that was aided and abetted by systemic instinctual 
oppression for which the only outlet was the commodified sexuality of pop culture.   
The Neo-Freudian schools promote the very same values as cure against 
unfreedom and suffering – as the triumph over repression. This intellectual feat 
is accomplished by expurgating the instinctual dynamic and reducing its part 
in the mental life. Thus purified, the psyche can again be redeemed by 
idealistic ethics and religion.11   
In other words, the true “illusion” is not traditional religious belief with all its 
supernatural and superstitious appurtenances, but the secularization of its contents a 
la Kantian moralism and the “repressive” redirection of the instincts themselves 
concomitantly toward harmless fantasies and socially “productive” group activities – 
what sociologist David Riesman in the mid-twentieth century dubbed “other-
directedness.”12 Marcuse, as it turns out, was profiling avant la lettre what Wendy 
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Brown sixty years later would characterize as the hegemonic force of moral 
“responsibilism” that pervades and epitomizes present day neoliberalism.13  For both 
Brown and Marcuse (not to mention Nietzsche a century earlier) it is systemic social 
idealism rather than overt political tyranny that, as the old Robert Flack song goes, 
that is killing us “softly with its song 
Trump, Nietzsche’s Madman, and the Death of God 
What does all of the foregoing tell us about the Trump phenomenon?  Again, it is our 
contention that the “problem” of Trump is not really Trump, but the way in which the 
figure of Trump himself has become the vortex of a cultural cyclone that is ever more 
rapidly dismantling the entire infrastructure of Western liberal democracy.  Both 
Trumpism and anti-Trumpism signify simply a potpourri of positionalities strewn 
across the ghostly spectrum of a single obsessional neurosis.  Let us call it the socio-
politico-psychotic Trumpian imaginary, if you wish.  It is one that has overtaken the 
Western world in general, and the American cameo version in particular, after the 
death of God.  
Nietzsche, who of course is responsible for coming up with the currently 
overused, abused, and misused shibboleth “God is dead” (Gott ist tot, a clever play 
on words in the original German, as it turns out), had his own proleptic view of the 
matter when he composed in the late 1880s his Nachlass that has come down to us 
under the title The Will to Power. Nietzsche, throughout his writings, had denigrated 
modern, secular, humanitarian culture as the direct heir to what he snidely referred 
to as “the Christian-moral view of the world.”  The proper term that should be 
reserved for such a view, Nietzsche reiterated, is not “neurosis” but “decadence.”  
Such a hypermoralistic epistemology, according to Nietzsche, constitutes “a typical 
form of decadence, the moral hypersensitivity and hysteria of a sick mishmash 
populace grown weary and aimless”.14  Elsewhere in The Will to Power  Nietzsche 
uses the term “nihilism” to connote the same symptomatology.  It implies what 
Nietzsche, in contrast with how the phrase “death of God” has been leveraged for 
endless ideological, theological, and rhetorical purposes over the last half century, 
really had in mind with the trope, which he employs with surprising parsimony in his 
later writings.  The speech of the “madman”, who prophetically and dramatically 
proclaims the death of God, in Nietzsche’s celebrated parable in his book The Gay 
Science, culminates in the famous question about whether all “these churches” of 
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the late Victorian era, supposedly the high-water mark of the history of “Christian 
civilization”, are not “the tombs and sepulchers of God.”15   
Since Nietzsche with a few exceptions wrote in aphorisms and with his testy, 
polemical style almost never engaged in anything that might be remotely construed 
as philosophical argumentation, it is almost impossible to do the kind of standard 
exegesis with proof texts that might throw into relief exactly what he meant by “the 
death of God.”  Nevertheless, if we perform a contextualized aggregation of the 
repeated, but not necessarily numerous instances where the notion of “God’s death” 
shows up in his work, the following sort of picture begins to emerge.  First, it is clear 
Nietzsche is not, as many even superficial readers of him have pointed out, laying 
the groundwork for what in last two generations has been known as an “a/theology” 
or some kind of “secular” theological project that proceeds without the premise that 
the existence of, let alone belief in, God is necessary.  Second, Nietzsche is not 
simply commenting in his signature, wry style – as some liberal Christian interpreters 
have at times interpreted him – on the shallowness and hypocrisy of bourgeois 
Christianity.   Kierkegaard’s critique of “Christendom” is often confused with 
Nietzsche’s parabolic and poetic insinuations about the lifeworld of his day and age.  
Nietzsche, in fact, has a very dark and troubling vision of the “death of God” that his 
progressive admirers over time are seemingly incapable of fathoming.  The death of 
God is neither an historical “mood swing”, a fluctuation in the Zeitgeist, nor a leitmotif 
of contemporary thought and culture.  Nietzsche’s “madman” announces it as an 
“event” that is “still on its way,” that is “still wandering,” something comparable an 
enormous asteroid hurtling toward earth that is too mind-boggling, if not too 
horrifying, to consider or contemplate.   The incomprehension of the madman’s 
audience – the denizens of the “marketplace” who represent perhaps the more 
sophisticated strands of conventional wisdom – testifies to its still yet unrealized 
“apocalyptic” ramifications.   One is reminded, therefore, of the lines of the ancient 
Hebrew prophet Amos in reflecting on the irony that drips from the habituality with 
which Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God is misread: “Woe to you who 
long for the day of the LORD! Why do you long for the day of the LORD? That day will 
be darkness, not light.”16  
In key respects Trump currently plays the part of Nietzsche’s madman.  That is 
not to say Trump is either prophetic or praiseworthy in any sense of the word.   
According to many credible biographical accounts, Trump has for most of his adult 
life cut the figure of a self-aggrandizing, social climbing narcissist who has self-
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consciously cultivated the role of the bad-boy celebrity, while later in life striding on 
to the political stage as a contentious harlequin bent on fomenting the pose more 
like the DC Comics version of the Joker than the revered character of the Italian 
commedia dell’arte.  Trump does not by even the most preposterous feat of ingenuity 
measure up to the more roguish instances of those who have occupied the Oval 
Office.  But that is exactly the point.  He cuts the figure of the madman and, after all, 
madmen are exactly that – “mad”.  Nietzsche’s madman has always been both 
enigmatic and ambivalent.  He is mocked in the emporium of acceptable as well as 
respectable ideas, and it is not clear from either a close reading of the “parable” or 
Zarathustra’s own “teachings” (“God is dead, now we want the overman to live”17)  
what is really implied at the level of social change and cultural transformation. Before 
Thomas J.J. Altizer’s “gospel of Christian atheism” made Nietzsche’s saying an 
academic cause à la mode in the late 1960s, Zarathustra’s linkage of the death of 
God to the manifestation of the Übermensch could have been readily dismissed as a 
stroke of Nazi propaganda. That would of course matched the paranoid fantasies of 
an earlier generation with today’s delusional liberal musings that Trump is the self-
engendered Führer of a new American Fourth Reich. Is Nietzsche’s madman really 
the Cassandra-like seer of a fascist future?  It is as plausible as the narrative today’s 
so-called “radical theologians” have made him out to be.  
Whatever the madman betokens, there are certain viscera of him in the public 
persona of President Donald Trump.  Furthermore, Nietzsche did not mean for his 
madman to function as a literary figure begging endless scrutiny.  The madman 
serves mainly as a theatrical intervention, a rowdy staging.  He is more like the blind 
beggar that accosts Madame Bovary toward the end of Flaubert’s classic novel, 
boldly mirroring while flaunting back to her the very decrepitude of her own soul.  
Madmen, harlequins, and beggars are rarely perceived by their interlocutors for what 
they actually are.  That is not only the case with Nietzsche’s madman vis-à-vis the 
people he confronts in the marketplace as well as Bovary’s spectral nemesis, but 
also with the perniciously performative, über-loathsome arch-fiend rearing up within 
the outraged progressive gaze that comes across as everything associated with 
Trump and “Trumpism”.  The symptomatology of the politically obsessive neurosis 
that is the ongoing and tireless quotidian “Trump thing” somehow has succeeded in 
masking what might be diagnosed perhaps as an index for the collective 
disintegration of the “soul” of the present-day ruling class in America and the West.      
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The Neoliberal Context 
 
In my book on neoliberalism I argue, following a range of late modern and 
contemporary critical theorists, that latter day global capitalism – what has come to 
be known, generally speaking, as “neoliberalism” – has completely morphed since 
the mid-nineteenth century in peculiar ways that make it largely unrecognizable to 
both its familiar apologists and detractors, while paradoxically rendering it ever more 
amenable to the kind of rigorous analysis Marx offered in both his earlier and later 
contributions to the field of political economy.   In The German Ideology, composed 
in 1846 on the eve of the outbreak of the great European revolution that shook the 
world, Marx and Engels wrote that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch 
the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the 
same time its ruling intellectual force.”18  In what can be considered the inaugural and 
in many respects the most distinct definition of the theory of ideology itself, they 
added: “the class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has 
control at the same time over the means of mental production“.   
Under neoliberalism, which has in true aporetic fashion developed a 
“progressive” intellectual “superstructure” (to use Marxist terminology) in order to 
conceal its regressive economic “substructure”, the distinction between “mental” and 
“material” production has largely vanished.  In essence, the “ruling class” of the 
present day reveals itself as the class of so-called “knowledge workers”, a locution 
minted by the famed management theorist Peter Drucker way back in 1959.19 In my 
book I characterize the “substructure” of the new ruling class as the “corporate-
university-financial-information complex”. I dissect it as a distinctive social class that 
manipulates the levers of both the means of “material’ production”, which in the age 
of digitized media, computerized investment, a rigorously credentialed professional 
service industry, and an expansive corporate consortium of digital media in sundry 
guises, has succeeded in disseminating and inculcating a new “global-civic 
moralism” which, like the Medieval penitential system, enforces a of self-accusation 
about one’s discriminatory attitudes toward select marginalized social identities 
ostensibly aimed at the good of all humankind, all the while inexorably dissolving the 
dignity and physical livelihoods of a working class of all nationalities, cultures, and 
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races. It amounts to what Jean-Joseph Goux in a previous generation named the 
new “symbolic capitalism.”20   
It is also worth noting that “ruling class” does not necessarily mean those who 
have the most money.  One of the most common cavils concerning the theory of 
“progressive neoliberalism”, as Nancy Fraser has denominated the makeup of the 
new ruling class in the age of “immaterial labor” and “symbolic capitalism”, is that 
academics who for the most part superintend its symbol-manufacturing machinery 
are hardly rich, especially when one takes into account not only the comparative 
salaries of tenured faculty but the increasing hordes of low-paid and overworked 
adjuncts who belong with free-lance writers, Uber drivers, and a vast cross-section of 
service employees to what sociologists nowadays term the “precariat.” My rejoinder 
is that in Medieval times the Catholic clergy held much the same office, and despite 
the massive wealth accumulated by the Church itself through both bequests and its 
psychological extortion of the nobility with the sacraments of grace and the fear of 
hell, individual priests by profession were supposed to take the vow of poverty.  That 
did not exclude the “pastorate” from the ruling classes. It was quite the opposite, as 
the bourgeois fury of the Reformation of the Sixteenth century and the anti-clerical 
rage of the French Jacobins after 1789 shows.  If one is responsible for 
manufacturing and shepherding the “ideas of the ruling class,” one locates oneself 
smack dab at its epicenter.   
Returning to the problem at hand, it is vital, therefore, to ask ourselves what, in 
truth, the above implies when it comes to making sense out of the “problem”/ 
“symptom” of Trump and why an increasingly vicious hyperpolarization not only in 
politics itself, but in values and culture as well, have become the unmistakable signal 
fire of our times.  If one asks a representative of the approximately one half of the 
American population that loathes Trump and sees him as the living, breathing 
embodiment of the anti-Christ (the so-called “Resistance”), one will hear that it is of 
course Trump himself.  According to this now familiar narrative, Trump is a classic 
demagogue with either tacit or explicit authoritarian intentions who has issued not 
only “dog whistles,” but overt pitches toward everything violent and reactionary 
coiled deep down with the collective subconscious of the “conservative” and less 
educated segments of the populace, Hillary Clinton’s “deplorables.”  If one inquires of 
the other half, that is, those who voted for Trump in 2016 and are more likely than not 
to vote for him again in 2020, one will hear that it is not so much Trump per se, even 
though there is obviously a sizable segment that adores and idolizes him personally, 
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comprising the bulk of his routine histrionic political rallies.  Instead, or so the 
argument among the bulk of Trump supporters goes, the man’s utterances and 
behavior may indeed be cringe-worthy, and his personal history and character 
certainly does not even approach a standard that one might possibly admire, but he 
at least openly in word and in deed protects us from the other faction, which would 
gladly seek to destroy us (similar to the argument by which many Italian Jews 
supported Mussolini before Hitler later forced him to adopt the same policies of 
extermination).     
Interestingly, Michael Hirsh, a senior correspondent and deputy editor of the 
prestigious – and decidedly “establishment liberal” - magazine Foreign Policy, opined 
during the last week of 2019 at the crest of the U.S. House of Representatives-driven 
impeachment process that the Democratic Party in the United States has failed to 
heed the lesson of Trump’s meteoric rise in 2016 and complete makeover of the 
brand of the Republican Party in the first three years of his administration.   Hirsh 
suggests that the Republicans under Trump in the last election “transformed” 
themselves radically by jettisoning the “old ideologies”, including so-called 
“Reagonomics” with its emphasis on budget discipline and limited government, that 
previously had held them together for at least two generations.  Just as “hatred of 
Obama” from 2008-16 failed to win elections for Republicans until Trump crafted the 
positive, but demagogic message of “make America great again”, so an even more 
instinctual revulsion among Democrats for the current occupant of the White House 
cannot carry the day “if they don’t find a way to resolve the ideological war that still 
splits the party.”21  Hirsh  does not speculate what a Trump-like   
metamorphosis of the Democratic party might look like, but his argument makes it 
clear that it would have to be some version of committed economic redistributionism 
combined with an appeal to the “better angels” of racial pluralism, minus race-
shaming, as opposed to the increasingly rabid nativism of its adversaries.  In other 
words, no matter how an identity politics that excludes, or goes so far as to implicitly 
vilify, the white middle class whites has played in recent years with the Democratic 
base, it has served as a non-starter when it comes to winning elections.    
In other words, the not-so-well camouflaged elitist values, whether they be 
economic or cultural, that have defined the dominant ideologies of both parties in 
recent years are sinking rapidly under a global anti-elite “populist” insurgency that 
assumes a vast spectrum of flamboyant, if not disquieting, guises, but raises up 
similar kinds of personalities, from Trump in America to Boris Johnson in the United 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






Kingdom to Narendra Modi in India. Populism historically has fluctuated as well as 
shape-shifted between right and left throughout modern history, and almost always 
constitutes a kind of political reaction-formation to complex and often indecipherable 
seismic shifts in the psycho-social as well as economic fabric of the life of peoples 
and nations.  Its resistance to any straightforward method of typologization, let alone 
familiar ideological reductivism, hints at a comparison at the collective level with the 
sorts of obsessive-compulsive patterns of language and behavior, which often defy 
immediate diagnosis, in the clinical context.  But as is the case with any kind of 
confusing symptomatology that repels straightforward analysis, it also belies more 
deep-lying complexities that standard “therapeutic” paradigms too readily fail to bring 
to light.  As John Judis notes in his masterful analysis of the variety of contemporary 
populist upheavals all around the world, “it difficult to understand why what populists 
say resonates with the greater public, and how they are pointing, however 
imperfectly, to real problems that the major parties are downplaying or ignoring. By 
the nature of populism, these campaigns and parties point to problems through 
demands that are unlikely to be realized in the present political circumstances.”22    
Populism itself belongs to the same symptomatology of which “Trumpism,” 
whatever that term may actually mean, is merely a localized special case in point.  If 
we return to Freud’s – and in a somewhat different sense Lacan’s as well – notion of 
the obsession as a seemingly “irrational” defense against the scission of the subject 
in a desperate attempt to sustain an “incompatible idea”, then both populist 
enthusiasms and the continuum of elite language practices and affects that serves 
routinely in the public sphere to foster a demonization of those convictions can be 
viewed as two sides of the same medallion.  However, the medallion itself is not a 
solid object, but rather a set of paired discs that remain asymptotic to each other 
while hovering in a vacuum.  The two “sides” amount to parallel, but radically 
divergent (following Freud’s logic, we might even say “hysterical”) systems of 
enunciation that function as equally ineffective mechanisms aimed at accounting for 
the disjunction between ideation and content.     
Writing in The New Republic on December 31, 2019, the date which, according 
to the magazine, signaled an end of the “decade from hell,” Ganesh Sitaraman has 
argued, in effect, that the global turbulence that had been accelerating during the 
previous years was the immediate outcome of the “collapse of neoliberalism.”  As for 
the various “events”, which popular progressive narratives attribute to the phantom 
known as “Trumpism,” Sitaraman declares peremptorily that Donald Trump had 
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nothing to do with them, insofar as the putative causal factors behind them “were 
evident prior to the 2016 election.”  The confusion of causal nexus with 
symptomatology in standard psychoanalytic literature (take, for example, Lacan’s 
principle of the objet petit a) is one of the key features of both obsessional and hysteric 
behavior, not to mention styles of thinking.  According to Sitaraman, the inability to 
comprehend what is happening arises from a complete failure of previously operative 
ideologies.  The failed ideology of the right has been the kind of free market 
fundamentalism along with the mistaken belief that economic liberalization would 
inevitably lead to political liberalization, a grand delusion which the rise of China and 
Russia as formidable authoritarian and military powers from the ashes of Communism 
has underscored.  The failed ideology of the left, according to Sitaraman, boils down to 
the false belief, which can be traced back to what conservatives misleadingly term the 
“cultural Marxism” of the late 1960s, that political empowerment of previously 
marginalized racial, ethnic, or gender-classified human groupings would have the 
same kind of long-range emancipatory potential as the earlier, social democratic 
dialectic of class conflict.   
Sitaraman observes that “neoliberals on right and left sometimes use identity as 
a shield to protect neoliberal policies”, a thesis advanced a few years earlier by Fraser 
in her formulation of the concept of “progressive neoliberalism.” The upshot has been 
“that some neoliberals hold high the banner of inclusiveness on gender and race and 
thus claim to be progressive reformers, “even though the outcome “is to leave in place 
political and economic structures that harm the very groups that inclusionary 
neoliberals claim to support.”  By the same token, old-guard conservatives – both 
classic “free marketers” and minions of the religious right – incessantly talk about both 
the values of religious freedom and personal liberty while turning a blind eye to the 
corporatist takeover of the global economy that has been far more consequential for 
the extinction of the kinds of private virtues they extol than any form of authoritarian 
political overreach.23 
The “liberal” social and moral ideal, which with respect to religion can be traced 
to the Protestant Reformation, politically to the Glorious Revolution of 1689, and 
economically to the writings of Adam Smith, has indeed been the cultural ballast of 
American politics for most of the nation’s history.  Though it has been for the most part 
Anglo-Saxon in both its genealogy and its modern evolution, with the British empire in 
the nineteenth century and American ascendancy in the twentieth it became the de 
facto measure of international normativity in much the same way that Roman legal 
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principles together with ideas concerning political authority and sovereignty prevailed 
throughout much of Western civilization even after the empire had shrunken to a wan 
shadow of itself.  With the collapse of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
the socio-ethical touchstones that had historically defined “liberalism” were 
superimposed upon a planetary filigree of divergent cultural habituses that became 
arbitrarily stitched together through the predominance of market mechanisms as well 
as new and sophisticated computational and communication technologies.   
Strangely, what came to pass was not dissimilar to the Roman Catholic Church in the 
early Middle Ages where formal Nicene creedal memes were layered over religious 
sensibilities and practices that remained thoroughly pagan in nature.  The upshot was 
a mutation in the genome of liberalism itself as a political ideology that came to be 
known as “neoliberalism.”   At the “chromosomal” level the mutation corresponds to 
what Wendy Brown has described as a morphing of homo politicus into homo 
oeconomicus.   
But what Brown, not to mention others who frequently cite this formula, tend to 
ignore is that the lifeworld and life choices of homo oeconomicus are not necessarily 
determined by raw “economic” considerations.  It is certainly true that neoliberalism 
itself has relied on such a reductive anthropology in flattening human psychology, as 
illustrated in the development of so-called “rational choice theory” which, as different 
commentators have observed in recent years, was instrumental in fostering the kind of 
policy myopia that led to the Great Recession.24   Yet that myopia in itself diverted 
attention from the very disconnect between the seamless economic paradigm 
invoked by neoliberal theorists and the value cleavage among the differing class 
interests that supposedly perform as “rational” actors.   Despite the “economicization” 
of the political sphere under neoliberalism, certain value commitments among certain 
social class configurations have stubbornly persisted.  Furthermore, these value 
commitments have increasingly come to behave as markers of class distinctions 
themselves.  Hillary Clinton’s description of Trump supporters during the 2016 as a 
“basket of deplorables” is an infamous example of how a harsh moral judgment 
concerning voters for the political opposition became entrenched as the “differend,” as 
Jean-François Lyotard employs the term, for class consciousness.25  Lakoff’s well-
known concept of “moral politics” as a methodology for demarcating the cognitive 
substructures for the ideological passions driving the projects of major parties, 
especially in the United States, is a case in point.   
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Lakoff in an important sense has extracted his own “metapolitical” model of 
collective thought and behavior, interestingly along some of the same lines as the 
Frankfurt School following the Second World War, from the Freudian scheme of 
familial relations.  The “common sense” of politics on both the right and left, which 
always remains “unconscious” according to Lakoff, springs from the different ways in 
which this scheme has been mapped through both personal experience and moral 
concept formation.  The reason is simple, Lakoff says.  “The link between family-based 
morality and politics comes from one of the most common ways we have of 
conceptualizing what a nation is, namely, as a family”. 26  Historically, class and family 
structures have been differentiated along many of the same lines.  The family 
becomes the locus for both moral development and the evolution world views, 
derived in large part from childhood images (which Lakoff calls “strict father” and 
“nurturing parent“) that generate what he calls “radial classifications” spreading 
outward from their semantic kernel to encompass a whole galaxy of perceptual 
discriminations.   The so-called “cultural wars” are, therefore, simply covert class wars 
in an age when garden variety Marxist “class consciousness” has been suppressed 
through the dominance of neoliberal social valuations.   It is this underlying cognitive 
disunion that gives rise to competing types of “moral politics” whereby inhabitants of 
one universe are incapable of comprehending, let along empathizing with, the 
positionality of those who dwell within the other one.   Finally, it is the essential 
dissonance of these “incompatible ideas” that enables the obsessive and 
overdetermined reactions to the discursivity and demeanors of those who dwell within 
the alternate universe of meaning.     
 
Trump as the “Quilting Point” for A “Heteropolitics” 
 
The figure of Trump, therefore, has become what Lacan calls a point de capiton 
(“quilting point”), where “signified and signifier are knotted together.”27  Lacan derives 
the concept of the quilting point from mattress-making, in which an upholsterer sews 
down a button to prevent the stuffing from sloshing around willy-nilly.  Lacan utilitizes 
the theories of Ferdinand Saussure in his Course on General Linguistics to develop his 
argument.  In the kind of structural linguistics invented by Saussure, language is a 
chain of differential signifiers in which “meaning” evolves as a progressive 
displacement of the semantic structure registered by previous iterations.28  Saussure 
replaced the differential signifier with the traditional word/image/thing triad of classical 
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semiotics, and it served as the background workings for the linguistic transposition of 
Husserlian phenomenology, which Jacques Derrida called “deconstruction.”  In the 
Lacanian approach to psychoanalysis the concatenation of signifiers operates not as 
an emergent cartography of the “real”, but as the process of subject formation in which 
the “I” finds its capacity for authentic and self-directed speech.  It is this odyssey of 
“subjectivation” that makes psychoanalysis possible in the first place.   
However, it is also through the appropriation of the “discourse of the other”, 
whether that be the parental voice, the linguistic rules for “appropriate” 
communication, the “demands of society” that subjectivation as an appropriation of 
the discourse of the other for the sake of self-realization manages to create clarity 
about one’s own condition, but at the same time to foster lesions and disjunctions in 
the affective relationship between language and experience.  Language plows like a 
moving ship through a vast ocean of indeterminable objects and potential affects, 
what Lacan characterizes as the sentimental “mass of the current of discourse, a 
confused mass in which appear units, islands, an image, an object, a feeling, a cry, 
an appeal.”  He comments in Seminar III: “It's a continuum, whereas underneath is 
the signifier as a pure chain of discourse, a succession of words, in which nothing is 
isolable.”   At some point the chain of discourse must be firmed up, “quilted”, so that 
the previous differential values do not spin off into a semiotic abyss.  As Lacan points 
out, “the relationship between the signified and the signifier always appears fluid, 
always ready to come undone.”29   Lacan cites Freud’s constant reference to the 
Oedipus Complex as one of the most important examples of how the point de 
capiton functions within the discourse of psychoanalysis as a whole, insofar as it 
halts the slippage of the roving signifier that goes along with a welter of incontinent 
and unacknowledged incestual desires.  The Oedipus Complex fosters a system of 
stable semiotic interconnections that otherwise would come unglued if the 
dangerous liaison of desire and language were somehow given completely free rein.  
Yet what ultimately underwrites these connections, Lacan proposes quite obliquely 
in Seminar III, is neither an introjected sense of otherness (the “me” that is recognized 
as an adjunct of the “I”) nor the “big other”, the internalized symbolic order.  It is the 
ultimate dyad of signifier and signified that goes by the designation of “God”, often 
associated with the nom du père, the “name of the father.”   
It is at this particular and distinctive “quilting point” within the discursive galaxy 
that we might refer to as “death of God” politics that the “problem” of Trump begins to 
become politically intelligible.  What we have is not just a “divisive” (politics is always 
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divisive, as Carl Schmitt noted long ago), but an irresolvable, increasingly centrifugal 
and dynamically self-annihilating politics - a heteropolitics to speak.  As Lacan notes, 
the slippage of the signifier comes to a pass where the ongoing “sense” generated in 
the chain of differential signs is in danger of skidding out of control.  The danger of 
this “unchained” differential process, according to Lacan, is always psychosis - and 
that applies collectively as well. In such an instance the trajectory of the signifier 
must be braked, although it cannot by any stretch of the imagination be fixated.  
Lacan asks:  
 
What is the role of the signifier here? Fear is something that is particularly 
ambivalent. We others, we analysts, aren't unaware of this – it's as much 
something that drives you on as something that holds you back, it's something 
that makes you a double being and that, when you express it before a 
character with whom you want to play at being afraid together, will always 
place you in the position of a reflection. But there is something else, which 
looks homonymous – the fear of God.30   
 
This exceedingly opaque passage from Seminar III underscores a still 
inchoate insight that we may leverage to draw an uninterrupted link between 
psychoanalysis and what is broadly understood as “theology”.  Lacan alludes to the 
proverb that “the fear of YHWH is the beginning of wisdom.”31  Lacan compares the 
Hebraic attitude with the pagan one as found in the writings of the Epicureans: 
 
The fear of the gods, from whom Lucretius wants to free his little friends, is 
something altogether different, a multiform, confused feeling, one of panic. The 
fear of God, on the other hand, on which a tradition that goes back to Solomon 
is based, is the principle of wisdom and the foundation of the love of God. 
Moreover, this tradition is precisely our own.32   
 
Lacan makes clear that he is not clumsily impressing on to the Freudian 
theory of drives “a curate’s idea,” that is, a theological principle.  The “fear of God” is 
not by any means “a signifier that is found everywhere”.  Lacan argues that is “quite 
an accomplishment” to have stitched together the semiotic capacity of all human 
fears and related anxious affects into a single signifier that transmutes them into 
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something “wholly other”, such as the name YHWH itself.   He offers an analogy from 
the line of a character in a play by Racine.  
 
This famous fear of God completes the sleight of hand that transforms, from 
one minute to the next, all fears into perfect courage. All fears – I have no other 
fear – are exchanged for what is called the fear of God, which, however 
constraining it may be, is the opposite of a fear.”33  
 
 Fear is alchemized into “faith,” which is the true beginning of wisdom. 
 
Returning now to Nietzsche, we should keep in mind that what he meant by 
the “death of God” does not by any remote parallelism imply a theological position.  I 
myself have argued for over four decades now that there can be no such thing as a 
“death of God theology”, because Nietzsche’s death of God entails “the end of 
theology.”34  The seemingly inexhaustible popularity of the term even until this day 
suggests possibly that, contra Lacan, both the expressions “God” and “death of God” 
have become “curate’s” terminology. It is a terminology that has been  reverently 
preserved over the years in caves like Buddha’s shadow in Nietzsche’s aphorism by 
those who no longer believe but somehow cling to a curious kind of oxymoronic 
style of “belief” that disguises their commitment to the immanent ideals of a 
neoliberal and secular “pastorate”, as Foucault called it, founded on a political 
spectacle of world prepotency on the part of secular elites.35  If one reads closely 
Nietzsche’s scattered aphorisms about God’s “death”, it becomes apparent that what 
has “died”  is not the construct of God per se (from which can be adduced virtually 
any kind of theological apparatus or any arbitrary “lifestyle” of having a “belief in 
God”), but the “fear of God” in Lacan’s sense that reduces the infinite fluidity of the 
divine signifier to a logic of semiotic closure that simply pretends to be open to what 
is intimated in the nameless name YHWH.  One no longer “fears” God; therefore, one 
no longer can pride themselves in possessing the ultimate prowess of “knowing” 
God.   
What happens then within the symbolic register when God is dead and the 
“fear” of God has been supplanted by the smugness of assertions of God’s death that 
somehow border on the scholastic?  The point de capiton now must be located 
within what Nietzsche dubbed the “Christian-moral view of the world.”  That same 
view is Janus-faced.  It may be both religious and non-religious, or Christian and self-
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professedly “post-Christian”, as I have insisted over the years in seemingly antithetical 
contexts.  In structural linguistic terms, nevertheless, the signifiers within this 
“Christian-moral” matrix slide about in contrary directions, coming to rest at opposite 
“quilting points”, or anchoring their respective differential pathways within non-
identical semiotic spaces.  This sort of differential between moralized “master 
signifiers” within an immanent frame of social and political orientation creates a 
traumatic slippage in itself, comparable to the separation of tectonic plates that 
cause sudden, violent earthquakes.  The violence itself of this unspoken “paralogism” 
within the political imaginary, which governs the attitudes and behavior of every 
social actor, comes to be expressed in a new train of vicious and vengeful 
associations that feed upon their own energy and reinforce each other in the 
direction of what might be considered a kind of “apocalyptic” frenzy.   
Trump himself almost unconsciously (and the “unconscious” of course is 
where the dynamism of these trains of association happen) has aptly exhibited this 
pattern with his inflammatory rhetoric bordering at times on the nihilistic. As Lakoff 
himself has emphasized, Trump’s rhetorical technique amounts to a method of 
“deep framing” of political issues designed to activate unconsciously in his audience 
an embedded moral world view through use of charged metaphors and repetition of 
key phrases.36  It is because of this technique that almost subliminally determines 
through his performance style a visceral clash with the “moral politics” of his 
adversaries that the slippage between the two frames can appear, depending on 
one’s own angle of perception, well-nigh catastrophic.  This performance style not 
only shores up the anger his supporters feel toward those who inhabit the other 
world on account of their repeated denigration of them as profoundly stupid or 
“immoral”, but simultaneously stokes the rage of his opponents, who through 
constant repetition of their own affective responses, become incapable of seeing 
anything beyond the horizons of their respective embedded “deep frame.”  The 
“problem” of Trump is not Trump per se, but the increasingly rigidity and 
impermeability of the frames themselves, which have now become a true 
heteropolitics that runs the risk of becoming in some eerie sense an infinitely 
fractionating “clash of civilizational world pictures” about the meaning of democracy 
itself.  Both these world pictures have historic roots and respectable genealogies that 
need to be reconciled, if our own looming civilizational calamity is to be averted.   
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